Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Causal theory of knowledge: The causal theory of knowledge posits that knowledge requires a causal connection between a belief and the truth of the proposition it concerns, meaning that the belief was caused by the truth. See also Causality, Explanations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Robert Brandom on Causal Theory of Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
I 310ff Causal theory of knowledge/GoldmanVs/Barn facades: classic causal theory: Knowledge for the wrong reasons no knowledge. Alvin Goldman: example: residents of real-barn province expresses genuine knowledge - the knowledge of the resident of the fassade province no real knowledge - Problem: mere chance whether real barn - the difference of circumstances has influence, even if they are causally irrelevant. >Barn facades. Quantity: few (unrecognizable) sparrow dummies do not turn a reliable onlooker into an unreliable one; they will, however, when there are many dummies - reliability is the correct term for the barn ((s) The method does not change when many dummies are used.) I 312 Goldman: underlines the possibility of gerrymandering: it depends on whether you are in the center or at the edge of the province when it comes to allocating values. >Gerrymandering. --- II 149 Knowledge/Causal Theory of Knowledge/Goldman/Brandom: objective probability can only specified relative to a reference class - but the world itself does not distinguish such classes - so the choice of the reference class in turn is not determined objectively by naturalistically specifiable facts. >Facts. II 149 f Barn facades/Goldman/Brandom: VsCausal Theory - Pioneer of reliability theories - Causal chain must be ideal - E.g. facades of provinces, each with changed practices: fake/real ... etc. - then it depends entirely on the choice of the reference class, whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge - maximum reliable: the narrowest reference class. Internalism/twin earth: it could be argued that the internal states are similar - Goldman/Brandom: all in all, the presence of fakes (barn facades) in the surroundings is causally irrelevant. >Cf. >Twin earth. II 152 Brandom: the circumstances are external! ((s) so it is true?). BrandomVsQuine: Goldman does not support the naturalistic epistemology, because knowledge is independent of the choice of the reference class - so one argument place remains empty. - It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as a citizen of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistically formulated ones. - Definition naturalistic blind spot of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether an observer is reliable or not depends on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances that have nothing to do with the object under observation. II 155 Reliability theories: good reason for not separating belief from good inference - difference: knowledge/authorization for knowledge. >Reliability theory._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |